The conveyance included in brackets ("[...]") herein is incorporated into the treatment of the liability in tort for judicial activity which would ever have resulted in any unjustified injury to any given litigant and/or anyone not a litigant in any given case, who might have ever been unjustifiably injured by any given component of judicial activity.
[It is not the case that judges are only liable in tort for injuries unjustifiably caused by "deliberate wrongdoing" as Fr. H. Davis S.J. asserts in his "Duties of Certain Classes of Laypersons" Chapter in his four volume Moral Theology treatise, published by Sheed and Ward, repeatedly from the 1930's through 1958.
On the contrary, human persons are morally responsible not only for the results of human activity that are directly intended by them but for any and all results of activity which would ever foreseeably have resulted, howsoever unintendedly in any given instance, from human activity ever conducted by any human person. This principle is an indispensable component of what is known as the "Doctrine of the Double Effect" and is binding at all times, in all circumstances, upon all persons possessing the use of reason.
Thus a judge is liable in tort not only for the consequences of deliberate wrongdoing but for the consequences of any and all activity not conducted with sufficient care to ensure that no one would be unjustifiably injured whereby in any given instance. A judge would be bound to have conducted inquiry into the foreseeable consequences of activity ever conducted by him or her in any exercise of judicial authority prior to the exercise of any given exercise of judicial authority, adequate to ensure that no one would incur any unjustifiable injury wherefrom and any lack of compliance with this requirement which would ever result in any unjustified injury to anyone would leave any judge responsible wherefore in any given instance liable to any such type victim in tort. ]