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1. D/L of ...Petition ....11/5/15p

2. Proposed Order of 11/9/15...

3. Partial Plenary Component of Petition for Institution of Criminal Charges ...Martin...11/5/15 - grifdlmartcrim11515p.html

Doc. #2 from D/L of Petition...

Circuit Court of Cook County, IL

More

v Case # 11 CH 12339

Griffith, et al

Proposed Order of 11/9/15 of Robert J. More in Regard to Petition(s) for Institution of Criminal Charges...

1. Without anyone's having to be put to the burden of fully adjudicating the matters this order concerns ("these matters") at this juncture, this Court herein declares that no statute of limitations ("SOL") regarding any of the counts and/or persons accused of any violation(s) of the Official Misconduct Statute for the State of IL (720 ILCS 5/33-3), presently in place and operative wherein, could possibly have begun to run prior to the date set for the hearing/adjudication of the first post-judgment motion filed in this case (some date in early March of 2013), which order permits no inference in regard to this Court's position regarding the merits of the peition to which this order constitutes and initial response

2. Robert J. More shall be permitted to bring and use a laptop computer w/a camera/video capacity and a camera into any Circuit Court of Cook County, IL, ("CCCC") Courthouse in which there are computer terminals from which pictures of documents posted in the CCCC, Clerk's Docket for Case # 11 CH 12339 can be produced, solely for the purpose of producing a record from which to complete whatever petition he would seek to complete in regard to these matters.

3. This Court has been informed that attributable to the enormous hardships so unjustifiably imposed upon RJM by the Order issued in Case # 11 M1 013782 in September of 2013, restricting his access to the R. Daley Center in a way preclusive of his accessing court dockets in that building and the restrictions upon the use of computers and cameras in place in the Criminal Courts Bldg, RJM has not been capable of verifying the exact dates of the filing of various documents by RJM in re the case this document concerns nor the exact contents whereof referenced in the entries included in the petition to which this order correlates and thus that in regard to various entries included wherein, that should this Court not provide the consideration referenced in the entry #1 of this document, that RJM finds it necessary to have the criminal charges sought herein in regard to various particular counts presented in re whereto, instituted on a conditional basis w/o delay, subject to RJM's superseding, modifying or even possibly retracting any given charge in any scenario in which RJM cannot substantiate any given claim made to the best of RJM's present memory at the time of the making of such, with the contents of documents actually in the Clerk's docket for this case and/or in regard to which RJM can find a file stamped copy whereof in any given instance.

Robert J. More

P.O. Box 6926

Chicago, IL, 60680

608 445-5181, anselm45@gmail.com



Partial Plenary Component of Petition for Institution of Criminal Charges ...Martin...11/5/15 - grifdlmartcrim11515p.html

Circuit Court of Cook County, IL

More

v Case # 11 CH 12339

Griffith, et al

Partial Plenary Component of 11/5/15 of Petition of R. J. More ("RJM") 1.) to Have Criminal Charges of Official Misconduct Instituted Against Circuit Court of Cook County, IL ("CCCC, IL"), Judge L Martin, Which Incorporates Entirety of "First Superseding Components of Petitions...Martin...Madigan...Alvarez...Law Clerk of ...Martin of 11/5/15 Herein as if Fully Set Forth Herein

Under penalty of perjury, pursuant to the provisions of 735 ILCS 5/1-109, I, Robert J. More, do herein aver to the substantial veracity of any and all factual averments included herein infra, and that I am 55 years old and can testify competently whereto in any type of court proceeding and that I am a resident of Chicago, IL, at this juncture:

Herein is a partial list of counts of what RJM understands to constitute violations of 720 ILCS 5/33-3, against Judge Martin and/or others of those referenced in the title to this document, which is more than enough, according to RJM's informed understanding of the matters concerned to establish probable cause upon multiple bases for at least those referenced in the counts included herein infra, respectively in regard to the provisions of such statute, other than the Law Clerk referenced wherein in regard to whose role in the matters described herein RJM remains without percipient knowledge at this juncture, but in re which Judge Martin must possess percipient knowledge.

Introduction:

Superseding components of this document will be posted as soon as RJM can complete superseding components whereof, access to which can be procured via the "Table of Contents" of the URL included in the ULC of this document, towards the end whereof. By 13:00 on 11/9/15, RJM will, Providence permitting, have posted a "First Superseding Partial Plenary...Petition of 11/9/15 of ...." at: "thirstforjustice.tripod.com/grifdlmartcrim110515fsp.html", and by 16:45 on 11/9/15, RJM will have posted a Second Superseding Partial Plenary...Petition of 11/9/15 ..." at: "thirstforjustice.tripod.com/grifdlmartcrim110515ssp.html", and by 12:00 on 11/10/15, RJM will have posted, Providence permitting a Third Superseding Partial Plenary...Petition of 11/9/15 ..." at: "thirstforjustice.tripod.com/grifdlmartcrim110515tsp.html", subsequent to which all superseding versions of this document can be accessed via the Table of Contents of the URL included in the ULC of this document, as in fact can those referenced herein supra.

It is a terrible thing to fall into the hands of the living God. (Heb. 10:31). God can never permit anyone to be tempted beyond his strength but must always find a way for anyone afflicted to "make issue" with it (ie. - to find his way through any given adversity w/o incurring culpability for any sin in the progression wherethrough). (1 Cor. 10:13). For those who have shown mercy need have no fear or judgment (Ja. 2:13). Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good! (Rom. 12:21).

1. RJM filed a motion in the 2nd quarter of 2011 in this case seeking a stay of proceedings in this case until convictions pursuant to the provisions of 18 USC 242 in regard to all of the counts involving constitutional torts actionable via 42 USC 1983 could be procured , so that the Defendants concerned ("D's") could be collaterally estopped from defending the civil charges on liability, which Judge L. Martin ("Martin" or "Court") refused to provide any adjudication of in evident violation of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

4. RJM filed a motion set for 6/9/11 in this case seeking Appointment of a Special Prosecutor in re criminal liability RJM understood to be present in re the civil counts included in the complaint then pending and later to be superseded wherein according to the provisions of entry # 2 in "RJM's Proposed Order of 6/9/11," according to a formula structured such that RJM would not risk losing his Substitution of Judge Martin as of Right, Right, as explicated in that entry, via the submission of such motion, but Martin arrogated the authority to himself to disregard the plain language of that entry and deny the petition for such appointment, notwithstanding that such petition had not been presented to him in any way in which he could reasonably understand that he could execute such act(s), in evident violation of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

5. Martin denied such petition for the Appt of a Special Prosecutor in a situation in which the Government Prosecutor was also the Defense Attorney in the civil case this document concerns, defending on a civil basis the same activity and persons in regard to which RJM was seeking to have criminal charges instituted, never explaining how so obvious a conflict of interest could leave any adjudicator of such type petition with any choice except to grant such petition, in evident violation of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

6. In October of 2011, as RJM recalls the date, Martin procured and/or extorted the dismissal of the judges included as D's in this case w/ prejudice, and as RJM recalls, court reporters, w/o prejudice, which constituted a de facto retraction of the challenges to judicial immunity the complaint contained, which challenge to such cancer was one of the most important components of this case, via informing Attorney, A. Galic, who was then representing RJM that Galic would be subject to sanctions if the judges so named were not dismissed/judicial immunity challenges retracted (which dismissal was sprung in an audience in which RJM had both laryngitus and lacked any paper while standing before the bench next to Galic), never explaining how any given arrangement ever present in the development of the law in any given area could ever be modified, extended or reversed, according to the language of the rule promulgated for IL Courts in regard to the modification, extension or reversal of any given arrangment of law(s), if the advocate for such type development, respectively, in any given instance would have to incur sanctions in order to effect any such type development, other than in a scenario in which one sufficiently wealthy such that the prospect of the incurrment of a sanction in any given instance would not leave in place a disincentive to the seeking of any such type development of the law sufficient to deter the petitioning wherefore, in violation of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

7. Martin never explained how how the Defendant in the trial court case from which Bradley v Fis(c)her emanated could have petitioned for the institution of judicial immunity when it did not exist in the u.s. of A. before this case was decided, if such petitioning for modification... would have subjected him to sanctions for doing so.

8. Martin never provided any ruling on RJM's motion of Nov. of 2011 for 2/2/12, for the reinstitution of the judges and court reporters dismissed on or about 10/5/15 in this case in violation of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

9. Martin refused to provide RJM an order enabling RJM to bring a scanner into R. Daley Center and use it in order to scan the entirety of the documents constituting the court case file in the criminal case from which this case emanated - claiming he lacked authority to order the Clerk to provide such consideration - the permission to scan documents w/ one's own scanner.

10. Martin never provided any ruling on the Motion which it is RJM's best recollection RJM filed seeking to have the D's counsel, Groah and Conway, respectively, to either show cause that they ought not be held in contempt of Court or to be held in contempt whereof for falsely accusing RJM of not filing an Amended Complaint as detailed in the submissions submitted to this Court in May of 2015, in violation of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

11. Martin never provided any ruling on the Motion which it is RJM's best recollection RJM filed seeking to have the D's counsel, Groah and Conway, respectively, to either show cause that they ought not be held in contempt of Court or to be held in contempt whereof for falsely accusing RJM of not filing an Amended Complaint as detailed in the submissions submitted to this Court in May of 2015, in violation of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

12. Martin never provided any rulings in regard to the contents of motions filed in the 2nd half of 2012, by RJM in which RJM was endeavoring to ensure the adequate preservation of issues regarding the standard and method of the adjudication of this case conducted by Martin, except to summarily deny them without ever addressing the specific particulars regarding any of the relief ever sought in any given such motion, notwithstanding the Webb v Webb (__U.S._) burden by which litigants are burdened to get all issues of a federal constitutional dimension adequately pressed and passed upon in any trial proceedings conducted in any given case at the cost of relinquishing any claim to the addressing whereof by reviewing courts for not accomplishing such objective, which such non-provision of rulings was in RJM's understanding in violation of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

13. Martin issued an order in 2013 if RJM's memory serves him right as to the exact juncture of the issuance of the order imposing sanctions upon RJM in which he levied a fine upon RJM w/o any justification whatsoever and in regard to which RJM could not and cannot see any motivation other than to attempt to intimidate RJM out of his continuing to fight to eliminate the innumerable cancers, evils and sources of hazard and harm to legitimate reliance interests which plague the Courts and other government entities conducting activity in the CCCC, IL, and to otherwise for what to a measure of moral certainty can be identified to constitute justice in regard to the matters this case concerns, in violation of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

13. Martin issued an order in 2013 if RJM's memory serves him right as to the exact juncture of the issuance of the order imposing sanctions upon RJM in which was included an edict prohibiting the Clerk of the CCCC, IL from accepting documents from RJM after previously claiming that he lacked the authority to order such Clerk to execute any affirmative act/control the activity of Clerk in regard to RJM's petitioning the Court regarding use of the scanner referenced herein supra, in violation of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

14. Martin ordinarily and customarily terminated court proceedings in this case before RJM was finished speaking/never inquired whether in any given audience, RJM had completed any given presentation or attempted presentation of issues in re whereto before terminating any given audience, the effect of which was to render RJM incapable of adequately bearing the Webb v Webb burden referenced herein supra, except to the extent Martin's activity in this regard constructively dispensed RJM wherefrom, in violation of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

15. According to the CCSD Courtroom Deputy for room 2008 of the RDC, whose name RJM cannot recall (45 year old gray haired, small female), Martin ordered her at a certain juncture to prohibit RJM from using a computer in Courtroom 2008, which may or may not constitute a violation of 720 ICS 5/33-3.

16. Martin's order of 11/9/12 ("order") in RJM's understanding, constitutes a constructive endorsement of each and all of the crimes, malefactions and torts referenced in the counts included in the "Amended Complaint of 2/13/12" ("AC"), and otherwise constitutes a ratification whereof, which in RJM's understanding makes him an aider and abettor in re whereto in matters no less serious than that of the coerced psychotropic drugging of a criminal defendant found to be entirely innocent via a directed verdict against the CCSA Prosecutor in the criminal case from which this case arose which it is RJM's informed understanding cannot not constitute a violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

17. In the order, Martin never even addressed any of the counts included in the AC to the extent RJM could succeed in getting factual predicates and counts into the AC by 2/13/12, other than the ones referencing the first 3 torts and crimes perpetrated on 6/13/08 in re these matters, notwithstanding that there are innumerable entirely legitimate claims referenced wherein, whose legitimacy has not even been addressed in any analysis less of a broad-brush, under the rug sweeping than the order indisputably is, which span the period of 6/13/08 thru 12/17/08, in regard to which non-provision of either a demand for a more definite statement or an addressing of each and every count included in such AC constitutes a number of violations of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

18. In the order, Martin never even addressed any of the counts included in the AC to the extent RJM could succeed in getting factual predicates and counts into the AC by 2/13/12, other than the ones referencing the first 3 torts and crimes perpetrated on 6/13/08 in re these matters, notwithstanding that there are innumerable entirely legitimate claims referenced wherein, whose legitimacy has not even been addressed in any analysis less of a broad-brush, under the rug sweeping than the order indisputably is, which span the period of 6/13/08 thru 12/17/08, in regard to which non-provision of either a demand for a more definite statement or an addressing of each and every count included in such AC constitutes a number of violations of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

19. In the order, Martin never even addressed the count included in the AC which asserted a claim against to the extent RJM could succeed in getting factual predicates and counts into the AC by 2/13/12, other than the ones referencing the first 3 torts and crimes perpetrated on 6/13/08 in re these matters, notwithstanding that there are innumerable entirely legitimate claims referenced wherein, whose legitimacy has not even been addressed in any analysis less of a broad-brush, under the rug sweeping than the order indisputably is, which span the period of 6/13/08 thru 12/17/08, in regard to which non-provision of either a demand for a more definite statement or an addressing of each and every count included in such AC constitutes a number of violations of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

20. In the order, Martin never even addressed the contents of entry #89 in the AC, describing Judge T. Donnelly's ("JTMD") holding RJM in contempt (which was prepared as a charge in RJM's criminal trial, separate from the charge of trespass this case concerned) for filing an amicus petition in a separate case, which he later dismissed on his own cognizance that such filing was entirely legal, which disregard without even the permitting of any challenge to the constitutionality of any invocation of any immunity defense which might have been presented in re whereto, in order, at the very least, to ensure the preservation of the issue for review, it is RJM's understanding constitutes a violations of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3, as there is most definitely a constitutionally protected right not to be subject to any type of contempt of court, or criminal charge absent their being a legitimate basis for the institution wherein in any given instance and every instance in which any such type charges would be instituted.

21. In the order, Martin never even addressed the contents of the entries included in the AC which address JTMD's revocation of RJM's criminal bond which was later conceded by him to have been unjustified, which resulted in RJM's ending up in the Cook County Jail and getting coercedly psychotropically drugged, which disregard without even the permitting of any challenge to the constitutionality of any invocation of any immunity defense which might have been presented in re whereto, in order, at the very least, to ensure the preservation of the issue for review, it is RJM's understanding constitutes a violations of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3, as there is most definitely a constitutionally protected right not to have one's bond revoked without just cause.

22. In the order, Martin never even addressed the contents of the entries included in the AC which address the denial of RJM of his constitutionally protected right to file a federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to the provisions of 28 USC 2241 in regard to his detention in the Cook County Jail, which, it is RJM's understanding constitutes a violations of the provisions of 720 ILCS 5/33-3, as there is most definitely a constitutionally protected right to file pre-trial detainee habeas corpus petition.



17a. blatant disregard of msoj to preserve soj of right i=issues ruling denying appt of special prosecutor in arrangement in which motion wherefore had not been presented to him in case in which conditions explicated in motion were not present, such that Martin lacked authority to issue any denial of any type -depriving RJM of 9th Amendment right as well as substantive due process of 14th amendment, not to mention



18a. defraudments of legitimate reliance interests - rules on appt of special prosecutor in June of 2011 in arrangement in which petition was not submitted to him to rule whereupon except conditionally upon protection of MS OJ as of Right

19a. P's Motion of 10/19/12 for 10/18/12 - to add U.S.D.C for NDIL Chief judge, USMS to amended complaint for deprivation of access to FGJ,

20a. Standard and method of adjudication -motions throughout sept and oct of 2012 - Luciferian instigated flight from RJM's endeavor to superimpose structure around and upon proceedings sufficient to prevent Judicial hydroplaning (...) of the type which constitutes the ordinary and customary S & M of adjudication in Courts of the CCCC, IL, but all Courts conducting activity in Cook County, Il in regard to the activity of which RJM is cognizant.



"and so that RJM can get any and all issues still not adequately resolved re Standard & Method of Ajudication Secured Adequately So as to Have Indemnification of Such Against Any Legitmate Claim of Culpable Negligence re the Non-adequate Presentation Whereof & for Other and Furher Relief, Dependent & Independent of Response/Non-response to Document Presented to CCSD and CCAS on 10/9/12 ....j

21.a mistatement of postulation - Court claims that Plaintiff's ("P") allege that "...his case had been dismissed because he (RJM) had failed to appear for the hearing..that day, when in fact there is no such allegation to be found anywhere in the "...Amended Complaint of 2/13/12...."

22a.Court claims that P's own allegations are that upon being repeatedly directed by Sheriff's personnel to leave the Courtroom, Mr. More refused to leave, when in fact the AC contains no such allegations but rather asserts to the contrary that "...RJM informed all concerned that RJM would leave the 2408 as soon as RJM received a confirmation that either the Court had ordered RJM to leave, that the courtroom was closed for the morning or that RJM would be arrested if RJM refused to leave without either of the types of confirmations referenced herein supra.

39. No such type confirmation was provided.

40. Bergfalk and Griffith both addressed RJM.

41. RJM again explained that all RJM understood that RJM needed to procure in order to possess the authority to leave 2408 at what was then very shortly after 11:00 a.m. was the type of confirmation described herein supra, emphasizing that RJM would leave without delay if the consequences of RJM's not leaving would be that RJM would be arrested for not leaving immediately."; after which RJM explains the function of the formula RJM had used in this matter, which of course the Court conveniently omitted to include in its conspicuously selective presentation of the alleged allegations of the AC, -all in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

23. Contrary to Court's complaint about difficulty of ascertaining the number of D's named in the AC, such number could have been ascertained via a simple counting of the named D's and adding the Doe D's referenced as Does wherein to such number.

24. On page 3 of the Order, the Court claims that "More filed his amended complaint without filing a motion to vacate ...the Dismissal Order (in re the Judicial and Court Reporter Defendants) which claim constituted the basis for the Court's granting dismissal against the Court Reporters, when in fact it is the case that RJM filed a motion on 10/28/11 set for 2/2/12 to "Reconsider Order of 10/5/11 *, ...reinstate all D's dismissed in this case....". * In the proceeding in which the Court extorted the dismissal of the Judges and Court Reporters via the notification of his intent to sanction Galic,were Galic to not dismiss such individuals, respectively, RJM was incapable of speaking attributable to laryngitis and lacked any paper while standing adjacent to Attorney Galic at the bench with which to compose any note of objection to Galic's capitulation to Martin's extortionistic ploy.

25. Contrary to the Court's claim that RJM has used "...this forum as a bully pulpit...unrelated...action.", in fact RJM has found it necessary to include material in the AC for the purpose of protecting the theatre from the endeavor to keep the ubiquitous yellow smiley face facade which is encountered by citizens every hour of every day in Cook County, IL, off of the skull and cross bones, Jn. 3:19, Eph. 5:8, Jn 8:44, activity which constitutes the ordinary and customary character of Cook County, IL and State of IL activity.

26. The Court claims that there are "rules prohibiting it [the use of tape recording devices]" in CCCC, IL Courtrooms, when in fact RJM informed the Court way back in June, or at the latest July of 2011 that it was RJM's understanding that the SCOTUS opinion in Murdock v PA ("_U.S._) squarely foreclosed the use of any such rule in the postulation that "No state may take a secured right and reduce it to a privilege and require the issuance of a license for the exercise whereof." (in which construction the SCOTUS obviously intended to use the term "procurement" in the place of "issuance"), which is exactly what the restriction of the use of ERD's in Courtrooms in CCCC, IL to licensed stenographers was effecting, to which notification, the Court responded that stenographer's reports were necessary because such could be certified, as if certification could add anything to the accuracy of a record of proceedings which any uncertified record could not provide, and as if, participants could not verify the contents of any proceeding via verifications under penalty of perjury of their own, of the contents whereof in any given instance.

27. True to form, besides blatantly and flagrantly disregarding such controlling authority in Murdock, the Court further disregarded the Opinion issued in May of 2012, in ACLU v Alvarez, by the CCA 7, (which was never overturned by the SCOTUS and of course could not have been without the overturning of Murdock) declaring the "probable unconstitutionality of the eavesdropping statute then applicable in IL"in opining that there was a constitutionally protected right to produce electronic recordings of activity conducted by public officials conducting activity in public theatres" which is a paraphrase of whatever constitued the exact wording of such principle in that opinion.

28. That the prohibition of the use of ERD's in courtrooms in IL Court proceedings could not be prohibited was confirmed in March of 2013 by the IL Supreme Court in the case People v Clark (_ _IL. R. 3_), in which that Court acknowledged the existence of a right to gather information.

29. The applicability of the rule of constitutional law referenced herein in Murdock to the recording of activity conducted in this case was and is, uncontestable. Even beyond this fact, according to the SCOTUS opinion in Pearson v Callahan (__U.S._), issued in 2009, the scope and contours of a constitutionally protected right not addressed exactly by the SCOTUS at any given juncture is determined by the Jurisprudence of the highest Federal Court of Appeals for a given area and/or the Highest Court for a given State, and RJM cannot see how Martin's prohibition of RJM's using an ERD in the proceedings conducted in this case did not constitute another violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3, both in itself and as a component part of Martin's obvious agenda and scheme to deprive RJM and everyone entitled to consideration from RJM of the consideration which the use of an ERD would have provided - namely the making of the construction of facade of legitimacy which Martin understood could be kept over the criminal character of his adjudication, upon proceedings which were entirely lacking legitimacy, incomparably less difficult than it would have been had there been an ERD recording all that transpired in such adjudication.

30. The Court's characterization of RJM's purpose in filing various motions as can be ascertained in any substantial consideration whereof to have constituted in actuality an ongoing endeavor of RJM to superimpose adequate structure into the adjudication to compensate for the structural defect (what Solzenhitsyn referenced as the "tilt towards evil") by which the CCCC, IL is plagued so that the adjudication of this case would not constitute simply another miscarriage of justice of the type which ordinarily results in the cases adjudicated in the Courts of Cook County, IL with which RJM has been familiar, at this juncture as being to "harass... stave off..." is indicative of the criminal character of the intent of the Court in endeavoring to keep its obvious intent to defraud the public of the intangible right to the honest services of the exercise of the authority of a judicial office in its adjudication of this case suppressed and concealed.

31. The conspicuous superficiality of the references to the cancer of the various immunities referenced in the bottom of page 4 and top of page 5 of the Order will have to be addressed in future versions of this document and/or others, but RJM is convinced that all of such provide more evidence of the intent of the Court to defraud the public of its right to have such claimed immunities challenged, which claim is supported by the absence of any reference to any of the SCOTUS opinions in regard to such issues, any reference to any authorities such as the treatment of the civil liability of judges in the Moral Theology in Four Volumes, authored by Henry Davis, S.J. in which such liability is acknowledged and/or even a single reference to the arrangement which prevailed at common law in such regard, not to mention the contents of Magna Charta Clause 61, which affirms that not even the King of England was immune from liability for any wrongs which might ever be perpetrated by him.

32. The Court dismissed Count I of the AC (bottom of p.6 and top of p.7 of Order) against County D's w/o identifying any element(s) of the false arrest/false imprisonment count which was lacking in the AC, notwithstanding that the definition of such torts was presented in entry # 153 wherein and that the contents of entries # 154-159, wherein demonstrate how the activity this count concerns covers all of the elements of such definition, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

33. The Court dismissed Count II (bottom of p.6 and top of p.7 of Order) against CCSD Koppe w/o identifying any element(s) of the tort of battery which was lacking in the AC, notwithstanding that the definition of such torts was presented in entry # 163, wherein and that the contents of entries # 29-32, wherein demonstrate how the activity this count concerns covers all of the elements of such definition, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

34. The Court dismissed Count II (bottom of p.6 and top of p.7 of Order) against CCSD Koppe w/o identifying any element(s) of the tort of Illegal Seizure in Violation of the Amendment #4 Prohibition of Illegal Seizures which was lacking in the AC, notwithstanding that the identification of the elements of such constitutional tort was presented in entry # 166, wherein and that the contents of entries # 29-32, wherein demonstrate how the activity this count concerns covers all of the elements of such tort as defined at the juncture at which such tort was perpetrated, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

35. The Court dismissed the State Claims included in Counts I and II (bottom of p.6 and top of p.7 of Order) against Cook County, IL D's on the basis that they were barred by a one year statute of limitations ("SOL") notwithstanding that it was clearly informed in the AC that the complaint filed in this case was a refiling of a case filed in 2009, namely in this clause: "...County and State Officials and Entities whom this complaint and the one originally filed in 09 CH 18934 concerns..," which the accessing of the docket in re whereto would have demonstrated was filed prior to any expiration of any SOL applicable to these matters, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

36. The Court dismissed the Constitutional Claims included in Counts I and II (bottom of p.6 and top of p.7 of Order) against Cook County, IL D's on the basis that they were barred by a two year statute of limitations ("SOL") notwithstanding that it was clearly informed in the AC that the complaint filed in this case was a refiling of a case filed in 2009, namely in this clause: "...County and State Officials and Entities whom this complaint and the one originally filed in 09 CH 18934 concerns..," which the accessing of the docket in re whereto would have demonstrated was filed prior to any expiration of any SOL applicable to these matters, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3.

37. According to the Court, Asst. Cook County State's Attorney, P. Groah argued "that ... More's state claims are barred..." according to the claim included in entry # 35 herein supra, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3, which accusation can be checked via checking the contents of the "Motion to Dismiss" filed by Groah in 2012 in this case which is accessible in the Clerk's docket maintained for this case, and in regard to such matter, RJM would understand that both CCSA Alarez and Asst. CCSA P. Driscoll would have to be prosecuted for such violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3, as the Office of the CCSA refused to either stipulate to vicarious liability when RJM demanded such stipulation or to provide some justification for such refusal and it is axiomatic that authority can be delegated but responsibility cannot be and the defense of this case and so much other activity of the CCSA over the years has demonstrated that the priorities according to which the activity of such Office is ordinarily and customarily conducted induce the commission of violations of 720 ILCS 5/33-3 continually.

38. According to the Court, Asst. Cook County State's Attorney, P. Groah argued "that ... More's constitutional claims are barred..." according to the claim included in entry # 36 herein supra, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3, which accusation can be checked via checking the contents of the "Motion to Dismiss" filed by Groah in 2012 in this case which is accessible in the Clerk's docket maintained for this case, and in regard to such matter, RJM would understand that both CCSA Alarez and Asst. CCSA P. Driscoll would have to be prosecuted for such violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3, as the Office of the CCSA refused to either stipulate to vicarious liability when RJM demanded such stipulation or to provide some justification for such refusal and it is axiomatic that authority can be delegated but responsibility cannot be and the defense of this case and so much other activity of the CCSA over the years has demonstrated that the priorities according to which the activity of such Office is ordinarily and customarily conducted induce the commission of violations of 720 ILCS 5/33-3 continually.

39. The calumnies directed at RJM by the Court in regard to the "vexatious litigant" smear ( a smear entirely incompatible with rulings and expressions of opinion of various measures implemented by RJM by, among others, a number of judges) will be addressed in documents other than this one, but the Court's admission of a "jaundiced eye" is indeed a most appropriate one as RJM continues to demonstrate herein.

40. Time constraints being what they are in regard to the burden of completing this document at this juncture, RJM herein explains that none of the claims posited by the Court in its Order, in light of among other realities, the facts of a.) RJM's condition of homelessness and unemployment from 6/13/08 to this date, b.) this Court's constructively forcing Attorney Galic out of the prosecution of this case, c.) the obstacles this Court continued to place in the way of RJM's endeavors to get all of the "Standard & Method of Adjudication" Issues RJM endeavored to get adequately "pressed and passed upon" in the trial court proceedings conducted in re whereto in order to ensure the preservation of any and all issues of a federal constitutional dimension for review pursuant to the authority promulgated in regard to such matters by Webb v Webb (_U.S._), in fact, pressed and passed upon, d.) the refusal of the Defendants wherein to stipulate in regard to res judicata and/or vicarious liability issues implicated in the adjudication of this case and this Court's obstruction of RJM's endeavors to secure such issues, e.) the magnitude of the burden involved in rectifying the institutional iniquity encountered by individuals burdened with having to conduct any affairs involving government entities in Cook County, IL, f.) the magnitude of the burdens RJM has had to bear in terms of preparing for and helping to deter the imposition of martial law in this Country and to deter government violence and crime and the violence and crime of those who have continued to retain control over government entities in this Country, g.) RJM's health problems, h.) RJM's many problems of conscience given the aggregate sinfulness of the society, and epecially its institutions at this juncture in its continued deterioration, i.) the burden to which RJM has continued to be subjected in regard to the multitude of legal injuries he has incurred over the years in terms of keeping the claims concerned, respectively, intact, amidst, inter alia the shackling of RJM with entirely unjustified sanctions and building access restrictions, as RJM is convinced that according to the principle that the "Law cannot require the impossible", RJM has in fact succeeded in keeping each and all of the claims the Court dismissed in this case beyond any relinquishment whereof, respectively, in that there is not any legitimacy in the Court's order, nor in any of the orders which preceded it in re this case, nor in any of the orders entered by Judge Beibel in re whereto other than possibly one or two in some areas; in that RJM has not yet encountered even a single person burdened in all of these ways who has succeeded in accomplishing anything more in rectifying the types of countless wrongs and evils this case concerns than has RJM to this juncture.

41. None of the claims presented as a basis for the dismissal of this case is either uncurable via the making of amendments to the AC, the provision of which were beyond the control of RJM to this juncture, attributable to either the obstructions placed in RJM's path by either the D's, the Court, or both, in regard to demands and proposals made by RJM whereto, respectively, and/or the hardships and adversities which RJM has had to bear over the past several years, or attributable to any mal, mis and/or culpable non-feasance of RJM, and thus absolutely zero progress has been made by any of RJM's adversaries, which definitely includes this Court which has so shamelessly abdicated the role of adjudicator and assumed the role of advocate of the D's named in this case in what has constituted the "defense" whereof, towards breaking RJM's commitment to ensure that the ascertainable and identifiable ends of justice are eventually accomplished in re the prosecution of this case, even should that result not be effected prior to RJM's entrance into eternity.

There is no legitimacy to the claim that a State can constrict and restrict a federal remedy, this Court's accusations that RJM had committed a direct criminal contempt at any juncture in the adjudication of this case is entirely incompatible with the still binding postulation of the standard for such type contempt in a state criminal trial, published in "In re Oliver (_U.S._).

Document under revision with next version(s) to be provided pursuant to time table included herein supra, to the extent such objective can be accomplished.

Robert J. More 9:20 a.m. on 11/9/15