Robert J More
V Case No.
Village of North Riverside Police Department, P.O. Frank Schmalze, P.O. John Doe, Chief of Police Kratavil, Village of North Riverside Village Prosecutor John Toman, Village of North Riverside Village Manager Wayne Pezak, Judge Joan Pucillo, Judge Kathleen McGurvy, Cook County Circuit Court Chief Judge Donald O’Connell, Cook County Circuit Court, Cook County Sheriff M. Sheahan, Deputies J. Doe #1, & J.Doe #2, Sheriff Staudmacher, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County Dorothy Brown, Chief Clerk of the Maybrooke Courthouse Ed Howard, with all Defendants Sued Both in their Official & Individual Personal Capacities & the Municipal & Other Governmental Entities Sued as Government Entities
Robert More (“RJM”) herein asserts the following claims against various defendants in the above-entitled action:
(1) violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983: initial unjustified, constitutionally impermissible & criminal, interference (“UCI&CI”)with use of public highways & roads,
(2) violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983: UCI&CI detention,
(3) violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983: conspiracy to unjustifiably deprive a U.S. Citizen of constitutionally protected rights,
(4) violation of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3): conspiracy on the basis of invidious discrimination against a member of a class
(6) violation of 42 U.S.C 1983: harassment
(7) violation of 42 U.S.C. 1985(2): conspiracy for purpose of impeding , hindering , obstructing… the due course of justice in any State …with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, (Bell v Milwaukee 498 F.Supp.1339, Crawford 386 F.Supp. 187).
(8) violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983: issuance of a warrant without probable cause &/or claim that such warrant had been issued
(9) violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983: refusing or neglecting a.) to prevent the initial constitutionally impermissible & felonious deprivation of RJM’s rights & b.) to later respond so as ameliorate the damage consequently caused by the deprivation
(10) malicious prosecution,
(11) malicious abuse of process,
(12) conspiracy to unjustifiably, constitutionally impermissibly & criminally interfere with RJM’s efforts to petition the government for redress of grievances, utilize his rights to be accorded the provisions corresponding to the due process of laws & the equal protection of the law(s), so that in effect these rights were entirely denied
(13) intentional infliction of emotional distress,
(14).conspiracy according to 42 USC 1985 (2) within the court proceedings &
(15) via the activity of the clerks in refusing &/or neglecting to implement the measures needing to be implemented so that RJM could ameliorate the damage caused him by the deprivations & defraudments committed & inflicted upon him
(16) RICO according to predicate acts in contravention of 18 USC 1503, 1951, 1961 et seq. against all actors enumerated
Injunctive relief – prevention of any more hiring in …, prevention of any increase in compensation for ….[all parties who financially benefit from the types of asset seizures & property confiscations to which RJM was subjected in this case.]
1. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked under ; 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337, 1343, and 1367(a); 42 U.S.C 1983, 1985 & 1988; and 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968.
2. Jurisdiction of this court for the pendent claims is authorized by F.R.Civ.P. 18(a), and arises under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as set forth in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
1. Defendant Village of North Riverside Police Department is a municipal department of the Village of North Riverside located in North Riverside, IL.
2. Defendant’s P.O. Frank Schmalze, P.O. John Doe, & Chief of Police Kratavil, are all employees of the Village of North Riverside.
3. Defendant Village of North Riverside Village Prosecutor John Toman is the Village Prosecutor of the Village of North Riverside, whose business address is 6904 W.Cermak Rd. Berwyn, IL, 60402.
4. Defendant Village of North Riverside Village Manager Wayne Pezak is the village manager for the Village of North Riverside.
5. Defendant Judge Joan Pucillo is an associate judge in the Cook County Circuit Court, who is stationed in the Maywood Branch of that court system.
6. Defendant Judge Kathleen McGurvy is an associate judge in the Cook County Circuit Court, who is stationed in the Maywood Branch of that court system.
7. Defendant Cook County Circuit Court Chief Judge Donald O’Connell was the Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court during the period in which the breaches of duty, abuses & crimes enumerated in this complaint were committed, whose address was: Office of the Chief Judge, 50 W. Washington St., Chicago, IL, 60601.
8. Defendant Cook County Sheriff M. Sheahan is the Sheriff of Cook County, whose office is Room 701, 50 W. Washington St., Chicago, IL, 60601.
9. Defendants Deputies J. Doe #1, & J.Doe #2, are two deputy sheriffs who were stationed in Courtroom 104 of the Maywood Branch of the Circuit Court of Cook County in July of 2000.
10. Defendant Deputy Sheriff Staudmacher, is a deputy sheriff who was stationed in Courtroom 104 of the Maywood Branch of the Circuit Court of Cook County in January of 2001.
11. Defendant Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County Dorothy Brown, is the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County whose office is Suite 1001, 50 W. Washington St., Chicago, IL, 60601.
12. Defendant Chief Clerk Ed Howard of the Maywood Branch of the Circuit Court of Cook County, was the Chief Clerk of that Courthouse in the year 2000.
13. Plaintiff sues all public employees in their official and individual capacities.
1. On May 11, 2000, the plaintiff, RJM, received notice via the flashing of red & blue lights in his rear view mirror that he would have to remove the vehicle he was driving from the thoroughfare named First Avenue in Maywood IL, after having completed a turn from the eastbound left turn lane on Cermak Road.
2. A police officer stopped his police car behind RJM’s on the western shoulder of northbound First Avenue in Maywood & proceeded to approach the vehicle in which RJM was seated.
3. The Officer, P.O. Schmalze (“Schmalze”) then proceeded to inquire of RJM as to how RJM was doing at that time & to demand the RJM hand him RJM’s license.
4. RJM[,] realizing that this was an armed party[,] proceeded to comply.
5. Schmalze proceeded to ask RJM for prove(sic) [proof] of insurance on the vehicle in which RJM was seated.
6. RJM notified Shmalze that the vehicle was registered, licensed & plated in Wisconsin, & that it belonged to RJM’s sister who was at the time a resident of WI; & that as such[,] it was not subject to any Illinois law requiring cars registered in Illinois to have proof of valid insurance in them.
7. Schmalze proceeded to explain to RJM that RJM was going to receive a ticket for not possessing proof of valid insurance, notwithstanding whatever RJM claimed that any law required or permitted & went back to his car. RJM did not stand mute, & did not in any way acquiesce to the interference with his rights/commission of various crimes that was then & there occurring. On the contrary, he demonstratively objected to Schmalze’s notification of his intention to issue any citation upon RJM.
8. RJM then approached that car in which Schmalze was seated & handed Schmalze a number of documents notifying Schmalze that it was expected that Schmalze would complete the documents before leaving the scene.
9. Another car shortly thereafter arrived at the scene.
10. Shortly thereafter, Schmalze returned to the vehicle in which RJM was seated & handed RJM two tickets (one for an alleged lack of brake lights & the other for alleged lack of proof of valid insurance)& the materials RJM had served upon Schmalze & notified RJM that he would not complete the documents RJM had served upon him.
11. RJM would not accept the tickets in his bare hand, explaining to Schmalze that this was a “blood money arrangement” & so had to receive what was handed to him with a glove on his hand.
12. Schmalze then admonished RJM to “have a good night” with a noticeable grin, which reminded RJM of the films he had seen as a student of the Gestapo & the KGB.
13. Shortly thereafter, RJM contacted the North Riverside Police Department by phone & fax, notifying representative of it that he had been subjected to deprivations of his constitutionally protected rights under the color of law.
14. In the Summer of 2000, RJM spoke to the Village Manager, Wayne Pezak regarding the tickets & notifying him of what the law was in that regard. Pezak objected that the ticket was legitimate.
15. A few weeks later, when RJM spoke to Pezak, [P]ezak notified RJM that there was a warrant out for RJM’s arrest.
16. This notification distressed RJM & caused RJM to discontinue driving any car.
17. RJM had a representative of Senator P.Fitzgerald’ Office call Asst. Cook County State’s Attorney, Wayne Simpson, who denied that a warrant had been issued for RJM’s arrest.
18. In July of 2000, RJM spoke to the Village Prosecutor J. Toman regarding getting the tickets dismissed.
19. Toman notified RJM that if he provided a mechanic’s receipt that the brake lights were functional, that that ticket would be dismissed.
20. RJM explained that the car was registered in WI & was not subject to the IL mandatory insurance law, to which Toman responded by asking RJM to fax or mail Toman a copy of the car’s registration, which RJM promptly did.
21. When RJM appeared in Courtroom 104 of the Maybrooke Center in July of 2000, Judge Joan Pucillo denied RJM his rights to due process of law, equal protection of the laws & the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances by refusing to consider the several motions that RJM endeavored to present to her. She only set the case for a jury trial as RJM demanded, & left the room after RJM notified her of his intention to obtain rulings on several interrelated issues, including the status of the alleged warrant, without which rulings RJM did not know how he could proceed to get the citations dismissed.
22. Sheriff’s J. Doe #1, & J.Doe #2 proceeded to make physical contact with RJM in forcing him to leave the Courtroom when the Judge exited it & RJM was still endeavoring to get various issues that he needed addressed in that hearing without having to return to that Court again unnecessarily.
23. On August 21, 2000, RJM appeared in the Courtroom presided over by Judge K. McGurvey, Judge #1670, who would not consider the several issues RJM endeavored to raise in that hearing but rather set the case over to 10/5/2000 & set a briefing schedule for the motions, over RJM’s objections.
24. RJM followed the directions issued in the Order issued on 8/21/2000 & the Village never responded.
25. On 10/5/2000, the case was called & RJM moved to have his motions considered. Somehow the no brake light ticket had been dismissed without RJM’s ever having succeeded in formally getting a petition for such relief before the Court.
26. RJM surmises on information & belief that it was dismissed so that the issue of the provision for a jury trial could be circumvented . RJM surmises that there was an exparte communication that accomplished this, as the Village Prosecutor Toman was seen conducting activity in the hallway in the [J]udge’s chamber’s area.
27. Although there were no facts adequately pleaded by the prosecution, & the only claim that the prosecution had posited besides the brake light ticket[,] that was dismissed[,] was a conclusory allegation of the non-provision by RJM of proof of valid insurance, the Court, disregarding all existing applicable rules of procedure, the substantive legal standards applicable to the issue & the requirements & prohibitions of the Constitutions of the U.S. & of the State of IL., summarily rendered a decision in favor of the prosecution, issued the largest fine it could have issued for the offense allegedly committed - $500 – even though it had issued fines of for example $150 to individuals charged with repeat offenses of reckless driving who were represented by attorneys in that Courtroom on that day, & the Judge then ran (at over 200 lbs, this was a spectacle) out of the Courtroom before RJM could manage to enter any objections into the record.
28. The whole proceeding was a sham. Toman’s only claim was that RJM had sent him mail with references to an “extortion racket” on the outside of the envelope & that RJM had requested an opportunity to speak at the Village Police Chief’s retirement dinner.
29. At that juncture, the Prosecutor, Toman made a fu[r]ther spectacle of handing RJM an envelope in which RJM was supposed to pay the fine. Toman then notified RJM that Toman would call the police if RJM ever called Toman again.
30. RJM filed a Motion to Reconsider within thirty days of the hearing, but could not obtain from any clerk an explanation as to when he could get a hearing date set on the motion.
31. RJM then proceeded to repeatedly call the Clerk’s Office & the Prosecutor’s Office but it took until January of 2001 before RJM was finally able to get the date for hearing set for 1/31/01.
32. On 1/31/01, RJM appeared, had his case moved to the end of the call, when the Courtroom was empty of non-government employee citizens, witnessed Toman conduct an ex-parte conference with the Judge, objected & then encountered the Judge’s decision to leave the Courtroom claiming that she could not rule on the Motion to Reconsider & that RJM would have to return to have Judge McGurvey rule on it. The Judge ran out of the room with RJM calling for her to return & Deputy Staudmacher forced RJM to leave the Courtroom against RJM’s will.
33. RJM had another appointment to keep & left the building, after filing a motion & other documents with the Clerk’s Office.
34. From that point onward, RJM was never able to get even an answer from either the Clerk’s Office or Toman regarding the status of the affair, nor a schedule for appearances for the Village of North Riverside, after innumerable attempts to set a new hearing on the Motion to Reconsider.
35. Finally, in the Spring of 2002, RJM contacted Toman who told RJM to file a motion with Dorothy Brown herself regarding the concerns RJM shared with Toman.
36. RJM accomplished compliance with this suggestion, whatever the purpose according to which it was made.
37. In all of these occur[r]ences, developments, implementations, responses & transactions, both in the whole & in the individual acts of which the pattern of racketeering & defraudments consist[,] a very clear pattern of extortion, attempts to intimidate, obstruction of justice, conspiracy to deprive a U.S. Citizen of protected rights & interference with interstate commerce has been manifested.
38. In March of 2001, RJM was notified by Midwest Cartage that he would not be hired as a driver if there was any outstanding claim against his license.
39. Obviously the Village of North Riverside is responsible through its representatives, Schmalze, J. Doe & Kratavil for a) unlawfully and maliciously harassing a citizen who was acting in accordance with his constitutional and statutory rights, privileges, and immunities, for (b) unlawfully and maliciously interfering with the legitimate activities of a citizen who was acting in accordance with his constitutional and statutory rights, privileges, and immunities, & (c) conspiring to violate the rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed to Plaintiff by the Constitution and laws of the United States and the laws of the State of Illinois, & of (d) otherwise depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional and statutory rights, privileges, and immunities.
40. Defendants Village of North Riverside & Kratavil had knowledge or, had they diligently exercised that(sic) [their] duties to instruct, supervise, control, and discipline on a continuing basis, should have had knowledge that the wrongs conspired to be done, as heretofore alleged, were about to be committed, & were committed. Defendants Village of North Riverside & Kratavil had power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of said wrongs, could have done so by reasonable diligence, and knowingly, recklessly, or with gross negligence failed or refused to do so.
41. Defendants Village of North Riverside & Kratavil directly or indirectly, under color of law, approved or ratified the unlawful, deliberate, malicious, reckless, and wanton conduct of Defendant [P]olice [O]fficers heretofore described.
42. As a direct and proximate cause of the negligent and intentional acts of Defendants Village of North Riverside & Kratavil, & of Defendant Schmalze, Plaintiff suffered loss of income, and severe mental anguish in connection with the deprivation of his constitutional and statutory rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and protected by 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.
43. Defendants Village Prosecutor John Toman, Village of North Riverside Village Manager Wayne Pezak, Judge Joan Pucillo, Judge Kathleen McGurvy, Cook County Circuit Court Chief Judge Donald O’Connell, Cook County Circuit Court, all have incurred tort liability on the same legal reasoning applied to the Village of North Riverside & Kratavil for the inception of the abuses enumerated, in the course of the prosecution of the sorry & scandalous affair.
44. Defendants Cook County Sheriff M. Sheahan, Deputies J. Doe #1, & J.Doe #2, [& Deputy] Sheriff Staudmacher, have incurred tort liabililty on 42 USC 1983, & possibly 42 USC 1985, for forcing RJM to leave a public courtroom before he had accomplished the objectives he needed at various junctures to accomplish to fulfill what can be identified to [have] constitute[d] RJM’s duties.
45. Defendants Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County Dorothy Brown, & Chief Clerk of the Maybrooke Courthouse Ed Howard, have incurred tort liability on 42 USC 1983, possibly 42 USC 1985 & possibly RICO for neglecting to require that the Circuit Court of Cook County provide adequate access to the courts in order for citizens to vindicate violated rights.
46. Defendants Village of North Riverside & Kratavil, Schmalze, P.O. John Doe, VP Toman, Judges Puccillo & McGurvey, & possibly all of the deputy sheriffs named in the complaint have incurred tort liability on 42 USC 1985, & RICO besides the 42 USC 1983 liability for illegal ministerial acts committed, in their respective misconduct in the conducting of affairs involved with the legal proceedings enumerated in this complaint.
47. Defendants by themselves & in cooperation with one another have obviously maliciously used a legal process to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the particular process employed – in this case the purpose of siezing of assets & confiscating of the property of citizens under the color of law.
48. . All the Defendants except presumably Sheriff Sheahan & possibly his deputies & possibly Dorothy Brown & Ed Howard (a) had an object to be accomplished; (b) had an agreement on the object or course of action; (c) performed one or more unlawful overt acts; and (d) caused RJM damages that were a direct result of those acts.
49. In as much in regard to the RICO claims pled [that]: Offices of public officials can be RICO enterprises, United States v McDade, 827 F.Supp. 1153, 1181 (Clerk of Courts), that employees can conspire with own corporation United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, that [a] government entity make(sic) [may] constitute [an] “enterprise” within meaning of R.I.C.O. United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, that an enterprise may include courts. United States v Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23; U.S.v Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443, & that a city can be an enterprise. United States v Logue, 751 F.Supp. 748, 755 (N.D. of Ill): & that there are more than the two or more related acts necessary to state a claim on the RICO count, the RICO count must necessarily be recognized by this Court.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against all the Defendants jointly and severally, for actual, general, special, compensatory damages in the amount of $120,000 and further demands judgment against each of said Defendants, jointly and severally, for punitive damages in the amount of $100,000, plus the costs of this action, including attorney's fees, and such other relief deemed to be just and equitable, on the 42 USC 1983 Counts, for the same damages on the 42 USC 1985 (2) count, & the same damages on the 42 USC 1985 (3) count, & for appropriate compensatory damages equaling the same amount on the RICO count[,] plus treble damages.
Furthermore, RJM moves this Court to issue an injunction preventing the Village of North Riverside & any other entities that benefit from the types of fines imposed in this case from hiring of [a]ny more employees &/or from providing any compensation increases until the money wrongfully & criminally taken from U.S. Citizens in these types of crimes & scandalous proceedings is all returned to the proper parties.
Plaintiff respectfully demands a jury trial in this case.
The undersigned states that I am the Plaintiff herein, and have read the foregoing pleading filed [by me] on my behalf , and the facts stated therein are true.
13 May 2002 _____________________________
Robert J. More
2008 S.Blue Island
Chicago, IL 60608
[add challenge to sovereign immunity beyond ministerial acts category]